2024年，美国正式实施“电动车补贴新规”（以下简称“新规”）。其中规定，符合美国税收减免条件的电动车辆“不得包含任何由‘受关注的外国实体’（FEOC）制造或组装的电池组件”；从2025年起，条件扩展到“不得包含任何由FEOC提取、加工或回收的关键矿物”。我国被美国列为FEOC来源国，“新规”不仅仅在于保护美国电动汽车市场免受国外产品冲击，更在于施加影响力加快全球新能源汽车产业链“去中国化”。总的来看，“新规”对我国新能源汽车短期内直接冲击不明显，但中长期影响不容忽视，应尽快制定实施战略性应对措施。
“新规”成为美国打压围堵
我国新能源汽车的“第四支箭”
新能源汽车是新一代信息技术、新材料、人工智能等新技术的交汇点，是发达经济体高度重视的竞争制高点之一。近年来，我国新能源汽车发展迅猛，成为全球最大的消费市场和制造国、出口国。2023年，我国新能源汽车销量达到950万辆，占中国汽车总销量的32％，占全球新能源汽车总销量的66％；全年出口量突破120万辆，对汽车出口量的贡献率达到71％，新能源汽车和锂离子电池也日益成为拉动我国外贸增长的主力。
我国新能源汽车在国内外竞争力的快速提升，引起美国的关注，并加大打压遏制力度。在“新规”出台前，美国已经对我国新能源汽车发了“三箭”。
一是提高中国汽车产品关税。特朗普时期，美国对中国电动车加征25％关税；2011年和2018年，两次对产自中国的钢制轮毂产品发起“双反”调查。2024年3月，有美国联邦参议员提出法案，要求提高中国汽车进口关税，并对中国企业在墨西哥组装的汽车征收高额关税；2024年5月14日，美国正式宣布将中国电动汽车进口关税从25％提高到100％。
二是阻碍中国汽车供应链在美发展。限制中国企业与美国企业在电动车领域的技术合作，并对宁德时代等公司实施制裁和进口管制。截至2023年末，美国已累计将1200多家中国企业纳入管制“黑名单”，其中涉及不少汽车电子和零部件企业；2024年1月，美国国会禁止美国国防部采购宁德时代、比亚迪等6家中国企业生产的动力电池。美国试图通过这些措施对全球企业采购和合作决策施加影响，降低对中国汽车供应链的依赖。
三是加快资本市场“去中国化”。2022年，美国证券交易委员会（SEC）将包括3家电动车企业（理想、蔚来和小鹏）在内的中概股列入“预摘牌名单”。此外，美国还提出“友岸外包”，并说服盟国把产能向所谓“友好国家”转移，拉拢东盟国家实现与美国企业的对接。
“新规”是美国限制中国新能源汽车的“第四箭”。它主要从消费市场入手，通过歧视性补贴政策，全方位削弱中国汽车市场竞争力。自2022年开始，美国先后出台《芯片和科学法案》《通胀削减法案》，在电动汽车领域设置歧视性补贴条款。“新规”则从国家、企业、关键部件、上游材料等多个环节，进一步细化获取补贴的前置条件。“新规”与关税、管制、资本市场等策略一起，将形成相互叠加强化的打压政策体系。
整体上，“新规”对我国新能源汽车的间接影响大于直接影响，中长期影响大于短期影响。特别是美国凭借其政治和经济影响力，试图阻碍我国与全球企业、市场、供应链的深度合作，削弱我国汽车整车和汽车零部件的全球竞争力。
1．“新规”对我国新能源汽车产业短期和直接冲击不大
首先，我国对美整车出口数量少、占比低。目前我国新能源汽车出口主要集中在亚洲和欧洲地区，在持续的限制打压下，2023年我国对美国和加拿大合计出口纯电动汽车3.3万辆，仅占我国新能源汽车出口总量的1.4％。
其次，全球范围难以在短期内实现对我国产品和供应链的替代。我国汽车零部件占全球市场规模的三成左右，其中亚洲和北美洲合计占我国零部件出口总额的63％；全球电池装车量前10家企业中，我国占6家，装车量合计占全球的近2/3。我国稀土和锂加工量约占全球2/3，钴和锰约占全球的75％和95％。基于成本和效率，跨国汽车企业短期寻找新的供应商进行替代的可能性及可行性不大、意愿不强。
第三，不会明显影响我国新能源汽车价格竞争力。“新规”明确每辆电动车涉及的税收优惠最高为7500美元。据测算，2023年美国电动车市场平均车价约为5.2万美元，我国电动车对美出口均价约3.7万美元，即使没有补贴，仍有一定价格竞争力。而且目前欧洲大部分出口到美国的汽车也不能享受补贴，“新规”同样也会削弱欧洲出口到美国的汽车的价格竞争力。
2．“新规”的不利影响主要体现在间接影响上
“新规”对我国新能源汽车发展的不利影响，主要体现在中长期的间接影响上。
一是部分国家（地区）或将跟进效仿。美国已牵头组建了“四方联盟”，并与日本、荷兰等国家签署了“三方协议”，成立了美国-欧盟贸易和技术委员会（TTC），形成所谓“对抗中国的新科技联盟”。美国将对这些“小圈子”施加影响，联合这些国家或地区“一致行动”，把排斥和围堵策略从美国向外延伸。例如，近年来中国与墨西哥加强汽车领域的深入合作，墨西哥也成为中国车企在美洲乃至全球布局的重要基地。但是2023年12月，墨西哥迫于美国压力达成外资审查协议，取消对中国车企提供的诸多激励性政策，将中国车企排除在北美自由贸易协定下的优惠政策之外。
二是以美国市场为条件胁迫欧盟等经济体跟随。2023年，欧盟对美国电动车出口金额是中国的20倍，再考虑到其他产品和服务贸易，目前欧盟在美国市场的利益大于在中国市场利益。美国将以此为筹码迫使欧盟、日本等“站队”，以牺牲在华利益换取在美利益。如我国不及时采取应对和反制措施，欧盟和日本等大概率会与美国联手。
三是干扰其他国家和跨国企业的微观决策。“新规”不仅要在美国挤压中国电动车发展空间，更在于要弱化全球其他企业和中国企业分工合作的动力，达到阻断中国全球布局的目的。对于这一点，我国应加以重视。如果不能打消全球企业顾虑，中长期将加速全球新能源汽车供应链“去中国化”。
四是阻碍中美两国企业技术合作。目前中资企业在美国投资建厂必须经过更为严密严格的科技审核，而且通过“长臂管辖”把政策影响扩展到其他国家。“新规”将进一步强化中国汽车及供应链全球布局成本和风险，挤压中国新能源汽车企业与全球企业加强合作、进行资源整合的空间。以动力电池为例，近年来我国整车及零部件企业加快海外投资布局。其中宁德时代、国轩高科、亿纬锂能计划在美投资产能约为129吉瓦时，相当于这3家企业2023年全球装车量的44％。但在美国陆续出台限制政策的背景下，这些项目都受到一定影响，如宁德时代与福特在密歇根州合作的35吉瓦时电池项目已经处于停滞状态。
美国出台“新规”等政策遏制我国新能源汽车发展，既不是开始，更不会结束。及时有效应对，事关我国新兴产业长期性全局性发展战略。把新能源汽车作为突破美国限制打压的突破口，我国也具备一定基础和条件。
1．构建更加开放的国内市场，把握发展主动权
积极扩大开放、深度参与全球合作，是我国汽车产业成为汽车大国的重要经验。美国越是打压、越是设置壁垒，我国市场就越要开放包容。在市场和技术上加强与中方的合作，是多数跨国汽车企业需要，在欧盟对我国生产的电动车进行反补贴调查时，宝马、大众等汽车制造商就曾明确表示过反对。我国要为跨国企业增加投资、拓展国内新能源汽车市场创造更加便利的政策环境，例如鼓励与中国企业合作成立新的新能源汽车品牌或企业，鼓励对中国新能源汽车企业进行投资，鼓励在海外共同开发运营产品等。进一步加快国内产业、技术和资本合作水平，强化“你中有我、我中有你”的发展格局，共同开拓和分享国内新能源汽车市场红利，用更大的在华利益削弱在美利益，提高欧日等经济体对我国实施壁垒和限制的机会成本，增强我国“以市场换市场”的谈判能力。
2．重点加强与欧洲的谈判合作，对美形成牵制
当前欧盟部分汽车大国对“新规”亦有不满，一些跨国车企对提高中国新能源汽车进入壁垒也有不同意见，当前也是抓住窗口期加强与欧盟谈判合作的时机。充分利用中欧、中德、中法等合作对话机制，基于共同利益采取“联欧制美”策略，形成一致行动共同应对“新规”，积极扩大欧洲“朋友圈”，为下一步的市场合作和企业协作创造更好的投资和贸易环境。
积极发挥在联合国贸发会议（UNCTAD）、世界贸易组织（WTO）、国际汽车工作组（IATF）等国际机构的工作机制和联络渠道，加强国内行业协会、重点企业与欧洲的交流，全面加强在技术、标准、研发、生产等领域合作。必要时通过上诉维护中国合法权益。
3．稳扎稳打推进新能源汽车企业全球布局
开拓多元化海外市场。依据我国比较优势和全球市场发展要求，在共建“一带一路”国家、东盟、拉丁美洲等新兴市场，引导企业灵活运用整车出口、当地组装、合资合作等方式，加强整车和供应链全球投资布局。借鉴日韩拓展东南亚等新兴市场经验，增强我国企业环境、社会和公司治理（ESG）意识，推动当地经济、就业、环保和社会文化发展，更多地争取当地政府和民众支持。
引导我国上下游企业协同“走出去”。推动上游材料、电池、零部件，中游整车制造，以及下游销售、维修、充电、回收利用等服务企业一体化“走出去”，鼓励海外销售、商业设施和维修充电等服务体系共建共享。在审批、融资、外汇、贸易、通关等方面，对于协同“走出去”的项目提供一揽子打包优惠政策。
避免国内企业在海外内耗“内卷”。加强国家、行业协会对企业海外投资、运营和竞争行为的协调，避免企业在项目竞争、整车出口和海外项目招投标中内耗“内卷”。提高在当地市场的认同感和可持续性，系统性提升我国产品、品牌和服务整体竞争力。
4．建立协同创新机制，降低技术和供应链的被替代风险
建立由企业牵头、科研机构深度参与、国家配套支持的创新机制，持续巩固提升我国产品的技术水平和性价比，降低技术淘汰风险和被替代的可能性。坚定电动化技术发展路线，以新一代电池和燃料电池技术为重点，加大对前沿、关键和共性技术的研发支持力度；进一步提高优势技术输出，提高全球新能源汽车配套水平和电池装机量。将汽车芯片作为芯片攻关重点之一，增强芯片设计能力和集成水平，加强功率芯片和存储芯片研发替代。
“开源”“节流”并重，完善动力电池全生命周期管理、追溯及回收利用制度和标准；研究制定国内动力电池应用循环利用材料的使用比例，提升镍、钴、锂等再生材料国内循环和供给能力，提高国民经济循环质量和水平，积极应对欧盟等汽车贸易的新法规新标准。
In 2024, the United States officially implemented the "New Electric Vehicle Subsidy Regulations" (hereinafter referred to as the "Regulations"). According to the regulations, electric vehicles that meet the conditions for US tax exemptions "shall not contain any battery components manufactured or assembled by a Foreign Entity of Concern (FEOC)"; Starting from 2025, the conditions will be extended to 'not include any key minerals extracted, processed, or recovered by FEOC'. China has been listed as a source country for FEOC by the United States. The "new regulations" are not only aimed at protecting the US electric vehicle market from foreign product shocks, but also at exerting influence to accelerate the "de Sinicization" of the global new energy vehicle industry chain. Overall, the direct impact of the "new regulations" on China's new energy vehicles is not significant in the short term, but its medium to long term effects cannot be ignored, and strategic response measures should be formulated and implemented as soon as possible.
The 'new regulations' have become a means of suppression and containment by the United States
The 'Fourth Arrow' of China's New Energy Vehicles
New energy vehicles are the intersection of new technologies such as information technology, new materials, and artificial intelligence, and are one of the competitive high points highly valued by developed economies. In recent years, China's new energy vehicles have developed rapidly, becoming the world's largest consumer market, manufacturing country, and exporting country. In 2023, the sales of new energy vehicles in China will reach 9.5 million units, accounting for 32% of the total sales of automobiles in China and 66% of the total sales of new energy vehicles worldwide; The annual export volume exceeded 1.2 million vehicles, contributing 71% to the export volume of automobiles. New energy vehicles and lithium-ion batteries are increasingly becoming the main drivers of China's foreign trade growth.
One is to increase tariffs on Chinese automotive products. During the Trump era, the United States imposed a 25% tariff on Chinese electric vehicles; In 2011 and 2018, two "double reverse" investigations were launched against steel wheel hub products produced in China. In March 2024, a US senator proposed a bill to increase import tariffs on Chinese cars and impose high tariffs on cars assembled by Chinese companies in Mexico; On May 14, 2024, the United States officially announced an increase in import tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles from 25% to 100%.
Secondly, it hinders the development of China's automotive supply chain in the automotive industry. Restricting technological cooperation between Chinese and American companies in the field of electric vehicles, and imposing sanctions and import controls on companies such as CATL. As of the end of 2023, the United States has cumulatively blacklisted over 1200 Chinese companies, including many automotive electronics and component companies; In January 2024, the US Congress banned the US Department of Defense from purchasing power batteries produced by six Chinese companies, including CATL and BYD. The United States is attempting to influence global corporate procurement and cooperation decisions through these measures, reducing its dependence on the Chinese automotive supply chain.
The third is to accelerate the "de Sinicization" of the capital market. In 2022, the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) will include Chinese concept stocks, including three electric vehicle companies (Ideal, NIO, and Xiaopeng), on the "pre delisting list". In addition, the United States has proposed "friendly shore outsourcing" and persuaded its allies to transfer production capacity to so-called "friendly countries", in order to attract ASEAN countries to achieve docking with American companies.
The "new regulations" are the "fourth arrow" for the United States to restrict China's new energy vehicles. It mainly starts from the consumer market and weakens the competitiveness of the Chinese automobile market in all aspects through discriminatory subsidy policies. Starting from 2022, the United States has successively introduced the Chip and Science Act and the Inflation Reduction Act, which set discriminatory subsidy provisions in the field of electric vehicles. The "new regulations" further refine the prerequisites for obtaining subsidies from multiple aspects such as the country, enterprises, key components, and upstream materials. The new regulations, together with strategies such as tariffs, regulations, and capital markets, will form a mutually reinforcing system of repressive policies.
We should attach great importance to the "new regulations"
Indirect damage to China's new energy vehicles
Overall, the indirect impact of the "new regulations" on China's new energy vehicles is greater than the direct impact, and the medium - to long-term impact is greater than the short-term impact. Especially with its political and economic influence, the United States attempts to hinder China's deep cooperation with global enterprises, markets, and supply chains, and weaken the global competitiveness of China's automobile vehicles and auto parts.
1. The "new regulations" have little short-term and direct impact on China's new energy vehicle industry
Firstly, China's exports of complete vehicles to the United States are low in quantity and proportion. At present, China's exports of new energy vehicles are mainly concentrated in Asia and Europe. Under continuous restrictions and suppression, China will export a total of 33000 pure electric vehicles to the United States and Canada in 2023, accounting for only 1.4% of China's total exports of new energy vehicles.
Secondly, it is difficult to replace Chinese products and supply chains globally in the short term. China's automotive parts account for about 30% of the global market size, with Asia and North America together accounting for 63% of China's total parts exports; Among the top 10 companies in terms of global battery installation volume, China accounts for 6, and the total installation volume accounts for nearly 2/3 of the world. China's rare earth and lithium processing volume accounts for about 2/3 of the global total, while cobalt and manganese account for about 75% and 95% of the global total. Based on cost and efficiency, the possibility and feasibility of multinational automotive companies seeking new suppliers for substitution in the short term are not high, and their willingness is not strong.
Thirdly, it will not significantly affect the price competitiveness of new energy vehicles in China. The new regulations specify that the maximum tax benefit for each electric vehicle is $7500. According to estimates, the average price of electric vehicles in the US market in 2023 is about $52000, and the average export price of electric vehicles from China to the US is about $37000. Even without subsidies, there is still some price competitiveness. Moreover, currently most European cars exported to the United States cannot enjoy subsidies, and the "new regulations" will also weaken the price competitiveness of European cars exported to the United States.
The adverse effects of the "new regulations" are mainly reflected in indirect impacts
The adverse impact of the "new regulations" on the development of new energy vehicles in China is mainly reflected in the indirect effects in the medium and long term.
One possibility is that some countries (regions) may follow suit. The United States has taken the lead in forming the "Quad Alliance" and signed the "Tripartite Agreement" with countries such as Japan and the Netherlands, establishing the US-EU Trade and Technology Commission (TTC), forming the so-called "New Technology Alliance Against China". The United States will exert influence on these 'small circles', unite these countries or regions to' act in unison ', and extend exclusion and containment strategies from the United States outward. For example, in recent years, China and Mexico have strengthened their in-depth cooperation in the automotive industry, and Mexico has become an important base for Chinese car companies to expand their presence in the Americas and even globally. However, in December 2023, Mexico reached a foreign investment review agreement under pressure from the United States, canceling many incentive policies provided to Chinese car companies and excluding them from preferential policies under the North American Free Trade Agreement.
The second is to coerce the European Union and other economies to follow under the condition of the US market. In 2023, the EU's export value of electric vehicles to the United States will be 20 times that of China. Considering other product and service trade, the EU's interests in the US market are currently greater than those in the Chinese market. The United States will use this as a bargaining chip to force the European Union, Japan, and others to "take sides" and sacrifice their interests in China for their interests in the United States. If China does not take timely response and countermeasures, there is a high probability that the European Union and Japan will join forces with the United States.
The third is to interfere with the micro decision-making of other countries and multinational corporations. The "new regulations" not only aim to squeeze the development space of Chinese electric vehicles in the United States, but also to weaken the motivation for division of labor and cooperation between other global enterprises and Chinese enterprises, in order to block China's global layout. China should attach great importance to this point. If the concerns of global enterprises cannot be dispelled, it will accelerate the "de Sinicization" of the global new energy vehicle supply chain in the medium and long term.
Fourthly, it hinders technological cooperation between Chinese and American enterprises. At present, Chinese enterprises investing and building factories in the United States must undergo more rigorous technological audits, and extend policy influence to other countries through "long arm jurisdiction". The new regulations will further strengthen the costs and risks of China's global layout of automobiles and supply chains, squeezing the space for Chinese new energy vehicle companies to strengthen cooperation and integrate resources with global enterprises. Taking power batteries as an example, in recent years, Chinese vehicle and component companies have accelerated their overseas investment layout. Among them, CATL, Guoxuan High Tech, and EVE Energy plan to invest in a production capacity of approximately 129 gigawatt hours in the United States, which is equivalent to 44% of the global loading volume of these three companies in 2023. However, against the backdrop of the gradual introduction of restrictive policies in the United States, these projects have been somewhat affected, such as the 35 gigawatt hour battery project jointly developed by CATL and Ford in Michigan, which has come to a standstill.
China needs to adopt effective response strategies
The introduction of "new regulations" and other policies by the United States to curb the development of new energy vehicles in China is neither the beginning nor the end. Timely and effective response is crucial to the long-term global development strategy of China's emerging industries. China also has a certain foundation and conditions to use new energy vehicles as a breakthrough point to break through the restrictions and suppression imposed by the United States.
1. Build a more open domestic market and seize the initiative in development
Actively expanding openness and deeply participating in global cooperation are important experiences for China's automotive industry to become a major automotive country. The more the United States suppresses and sets up barriers, the more open and inclusive our market becomes. Strengthening cooperation with China in the market and technology is necessary for most multinational automobile companies. During the EU's anti subsidy investigation of electric vehicles produced in China, car manufacturers such as BMW and Volkswagen have clearly expressed their opposition. China needs to create a more convenient policy environment for multinational enterprises to increase investment and expand the domestic new energy vehicle market, such as encouraging cooperation with Chinese companies to establish new new new energy vehicle brands or enterprises, encouraging investment in Chinese new energy vehicle enterprises, and encouraging joint development and operation of products overseas. Further accelerate the level of domestic industrial, technological, and capital cooperation, strengthen the development pattern of "you in me, I in you", jointly explore and share the dividends of the domestic new energy vehicle market, weaken interests in the United States with greater interests in China, increase the opportunity cost of barriers and restrictions imposed by economies such as Europe and Japan on China, and enhance China's negotiation ability of "market for market".
2. Focus on strengthening negotiation and cooperation with Europe to constrain the United States
Currently, some major automotive countries in the European Union are also dissatisfied with the "new regulations", and some multinational car companies have different opinions on raising barriers to entry for Chinese new energy vehicles. It is also an opportunity to seize the window period and strengthen negotiations and cooperation with the EU. Make full use of cooperation and dialogue mechanisms such as China Europe, China Germany, and China France, adopt the "Union of Europe and the United States" strategy based on common interests, form unified actions to jointly respond to the "new regulations", actively expand the European "circle of friends", and create a better investment and trade environment for the next step of market cooperation and enterprise cooperation.
Actively leverage the working mechanisms and communication channels of international organizations such as the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the World Trade Organization (WTO), and the International Automotive Task Force (IATF), strengthen exchanges between domestic industry associations, key enterprises, and Europe, and comprehensively enhance cooperation in technology, standards, research and development, production, and other fields. When necessary, appeal to safeguard China's legitimate rights and interests.
3. Steadily promote the global layout of new energy vehicle enterprises
Explore diversified overseas markets. According to China's comparative advantages and the requirements of global market development, in the joint construction of emerging markets such as the "the Belt and Road" countries, ASEAN, Latin America, etc., enterprises are guided to flexibly use vehicle export, local assembly, joint venture and cooperation, and strengthen the global investment layout of vehicle and supply chain. Drawing on the experience of Japan and South Korea in expanding into emerging markets such as Southeast Asia, we aim to enhance the environmental, social, and corporate governance (ESG) awareness of Chinese enterprises, promote local economic, employment, environmental, and socio-cultural development, and garner more support from local governments and the public.
Guide upstream and downstream enterprises in China to collaborate and 'go global'. Promote the integration of upstream materials, batteries, components, midstream vehicle manufacturing, and downstream sales, maintenance, charging, recycling and other service enterprises to "go global", and encourage the joint construction and sharing of overseas sales, commercial facilities, maintenance and charging service systems. In terms of approval, financing, foreign exchange, trade, customs clearance, etc., a package of preferential policies will be provided for collaborative "going global" projects.
To avoid internal competition among domestic enterprises overseas. Strengthen the coordination between the state and industry associations on overseas investment, operation, and competitive behavior of enterprises, to avoid internal friction and competition in project competition, vehicle export, and overseas project bidding. Enhance the sense of identity and sustainability in the local market, and systematically improve the overall competitiveness of our products, brands, and services.
4. Establish a collaborative innovation mechanism to reduce the risk of technology and supply chain substitution
Establish an innovation mechanism led by enterprises, with deep participation of scientific research institutions and support from the state, to continuously consolidate and improve the technological level and cost-effectiveness of Chinese products, reduce the risk of technological obsolescence and the possibility of being replaced. Adhere to the development path of electrification technology, with a focus on new generation battery and fuel cell technology, and increase research and development support for cutting-edge, key, and common technologies; Further enhance the output of advantageous technologies, improve the global level of new energy vehicle matching and battery installation. Making automotive chips one of the key areas of chip research and development, enhancing chip design capabilities and integration levels, and strengthening the research and development of power chips and storage chips as substitutes.
Give equal importance to both "open source" and "cost saving", and improve the system and standards for managing, tracing, and recycling the entire lifecycle of power batteries; Research and formulate the proportion of recycled materials used in domestic power battery applications, improve the domestic recycling and supply capacity of renewable materials such as nickel, cobalt, and lithium, enhance the quality and level of national economic recycling, and actively respond to new regulations and standards in automotive trade such as the European Union.